当前位置:免费黑客网-黑客技术,黑客工具,黑客联盟,黑客基地,黑客网站,黑客论坛DDOS黑客技术加密解密
日期:2016-04-26 22:13:46  来源:网络

OD+IDA6.1破解HideWizardv9.29(无忧隐藏)

偶以前搞过一些破解,但都是一些软柿子,前几天有隐藏木马这么个需求,包括进程、窗口、硬盘文件等,非要用HideWIzard出手不可。HideWIzard6.4有破解版但功能不够,只好拿HideWIzard最新版9.29开刀了。感觉还是挺麻烦的,也许是我水平很菜把,废话不说进入正题0)先对程序的情况说明一下,程序总共有三处验证,有些可以观察到,有些是破解过程中发现1.对注册码在客户端进行初步判断,输入不正确的话什么提示都没有,否则进入第二步服务器激活验证;2.与服务器通信,在static控件显示返回结果;3.使用imagehlp进行EXE校验,如果发现二进制被修改则自动退出下面详细阐述哈1)首先是PEiD查壳,啥也没发现,事实上到最后我也不知道是什么壳,也没学过脱壳,汗一个,哪位大大知道不妨告知哈。IDA6.1打开EXE,可以判断是MFC程序2)OD加载程序后,自带的7E42xxxx断点一定要清除,否则会导致系统假死,狂按F9过一分钟能缓回来,缓不回来只好重启了。加载成功后窗口切换焦点时也是一顿一顿的,不知是不是有意为之,调试过程中尽量不要切换焦点。顿的程度好像与系统和OD也有关系,具体作用关系不明,最好找个能自动清除debug标志位的。OD换了好几个才碰上个顺手的,我用的ODbyDYK v1.10里的Pza74.exe,能自动清除debug标志位,对call jmp等指令能高亮显示,Pza74缺点是插件不如OllyICE多,但OllyICE没高亮,看的很头疼。\3)正式进入调试步骤,首先需要在激活按钮处下断,因为没有任何提示,只好在CCmdTarget::OnCmdMsg处下断,在IDA记下地址在OD直接bp。OnCmdMsg第四个参数即为消息响应函数。函数如下,程序在0042AB9B处检查注册码位数,只要让输入的注册码为17位就不会跳到函数末尾,在末尾处可以看出SendMessageA是进入下一步的关键,因此中间的算法就不用看了,直接找跳转,把该nop的nop掉。0042AB5F /. 55 push ebp0042AB60 |. 8BEC mov ebp,esp0042AB62 |. 83EC 14 sub esp,140042AB65 |. 56 push esi0042AB66 |. 8BF1 mov esi,ecx0042AB68 |. 8975 EC mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-14],esi0042AB6B |. FF15 C4D14600 call dword ptr ds:[<&KERNEL32.GetTickCount>] ; [GetTickCount0042AB71 |. 8BC8 mov ecx,eax0042AB73 |. 2B0D A4F44800 sub ecx,dword ptr ds:[48F4A4]0042AB79 |. 81F9 2C010000 cmp ecx,12C0042AB7F |. 0F82 40010000 jb HideWiza.0042ACC50042AB85 |. 6A 01 push 10042AB87 |. 8BCE mov ecx,esi0042AB89 |. A3 A4F44800 mov dword ptr ds:[48F4A4],eax0042AB8E |. E8 B0530000 call HideWiza.0042FF430042AB93 |. 81C6 10040000 add esi,4100042AB99 |. 8B06 mov eax,dword ptr ds:[esi]0042AB9B |. 8378 F4 11 cmp dword ptr ds:[eax-C],11 ////////////////////0042AB9F |. 8BCE mov ecx,esi0042ABA1 |. 0F85 14010000 jnz HideWiza.0042ACBB ////////////////不成立则跳到0042ACC5处,不能跳,需要nop掉...0042AC9B |. /75 1C jnz short HideWiza.0042ACB9 /////////////////不能跳,需要nop掉0042AC9D |. |394D F0 cmp dword ptr ss:[ebp-10],ecx0042ACA0 |. |75 17 jnz short HideWiza.0042ACB9 /////////////////不能跳,需要nop掉0042ACA2 |. |8B45 EC mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-14]0042ACA5 |. |6A 0A push 0A ; /lParam = A0042ACA7 |. |6A 01 push 1 ; |wParam = 10042ACA9 |. |68 CA040000 push 4CA ; |Message = MSG(4CA)0042ACAE |. |FF70 20 push dword ptr ds:[eax+20] ; |hWnd0042ACB1 |. |FF15 84D54600 call dword ptr ds:[<&USER32.SendMessageA>] ; \SendMessageA0042ACB7 |. |EB 0C jmp short HideWiza.0042ACC50042ACB9 |> \8BCE mov ecx,esi0042ACBB |> 68 F2DC4600 push HideWiza.0046DCF20042ACC0 |. E8 1B7BFDFF call HideWiza.004027E00042ACC5 |> 5E pop esi0042ACC6 |. C9 leave0042ACC7 \. C3 retn4)用ue把exe改掉后发现程序自动退出,猜测是某种校验,这时程序不会弹出窗口,判断是在CXXDlg构造函数或OnInitialDialog等处。直接在入口处跟进,这里有个取巧的办法,直接od同时加载未修改和已修改的一起debug,比较哪里不一样,如果过程中哪个call直接把窗口弹出来或是退出,就需要重新加载跟进这个call。最后发现下面的代码,终于找到了,就是imagehlp.MapFileAndCheckSumA这个东西做的怪。查了一下imagehlp,的确是进行二进制校验的一个东东。0041E36E处可以看出[ebp-2C]与[ebp-28]一个是编译时生成的,一个是现算的。后面jnz判断是否一致,后面的OpenMutexA啥的应该是保证程序单例,是程序后面的逻辑,因此把jnz nop掉即可。 www.2cto.com0041E349 . E9 AD030000 jmp HideWiza.0041E6FB0041E34E > 8D45 D8 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-28]0041E351 . 50 push eax0041E352 . 8D45 D4 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-2C]0041E355 . 33FF xor edi,edi0041E357 . 50 push eax0041E358 . 47 inc edi0041E359 . 68 40EA4800 push HideWiza.0048EA400041E35E . 897D D4 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-2C],edi0041E361 . 895D D8 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-28],ebx0041E364 . FF15 FCD74600 call dword ptr ds:[<&imagehlp.Ma>; imagehlp.MapFileAndCheckSumA /////////////////////////////////////////////Checksum!!!0041E36A . 85C0 test eax,eax0041E36C . 75 0C jnz short HideWiza.0041E37A0041E36E . 8B45 D4 mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-2C]0041E371 . 3B45 D8 cmp eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-28]0041E374 . 0F85 81030000 jnz HideWiza.0041E6FB ////////////////////////////////should not jmp, so nop it0041E37A > 68 6C3E4700 push HideWiza.00473E6C ; ASCII "SEAN_U_HIDE_WIZARD"0041E37F . 8D4D E0 lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-20]0041E382 . E8 604BFEFF call HideWiza.00402EE70041E387 . FF75 E0 push dword ptr ss:[ebp-20] ; /MutexName0041E38A . 895D FC mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-4],ebx ; |0041E38D . 53 push ebx ; |Inheritable0041E38E . 57 push edi ; |Access0041E38F . FF15 2CD44600 call dword ptr ds:[<&KERNEL32.Op>; \OpenMutexA0041E395 . 8B7D DC mov edi,dword ptr ss:[ebp-24]0041E398 . 8987 A4000000 mov dword ptr ds:[edi+A4],eax0041E39E . 3BC3 cmp eax,ebx0041E3A0 . 0F84 97000000 je HideWiza.0041E43D5)终于到最后一步,这时运行程序随便输入注册码注册,发现还有服务器验证,IDA里发现程序网络通信用的是CHttpFile,继承于CInternetFile,结合IDA6.1的hex rays进行反编译,CInternetFile有四个方法,Read ReadString Write WriteString,我们主要关心的是读取,记下地址在OD里下断,发现程序调用的是CInternetFile::Read函数。一般人写通信程序都会把建立连接、发送、接受、关闭连接自己封装一下,因此可以顺便在IDA里把周围的关于网络通信的函数没名字的都命名一下,找调用者就结合OD,这么比较方便查看。用OD在CInternetFile::Read往上导,,发现一个可疑函数,IDA反编译一下:signed int __thiscall sub_42BFB4(void *this, int a2, int a3){ int v3; // edi@1 void *v4; // ebx@1 int v6; // eax@3 int v7; // eax@3 int v8; // eax@3 int v9; // edi@3 const CHAR *v10; // ebx@5 int v11; // esi@5 int v12; // esi@7 int v13; // eax@10 int v14; // eax@10 int v15; // eax@12 int v16; // eax@12 int v17; // eax@14 int v18; // eax@14 int v19; // eax@15 int v20; // eax@15 int v21; // eax@15 int v22; // [sp+Ch] [bp-20h]@11 const CHAR *v23; // [sp+10h] [bp-1Ch]@3 char *v24; // [sp+14h] [bp-18h]@15 int v25; // [sp+18h] [bp-14h]@3 int v26; // [sp+1Ch] [bp-10h]@3 int v27; // [sp+28h] [bp-4h]@1 char v28; // [sp+2Ch] [bp+0h]@1 char Src; // [sp+82Ch] [bp+800h]@15 char v30; // [sp+82Dh] [bp+801h]@15 unsigned int v31; // [sp+C2Ch] [bp+C00h]@1 v31 = (unsigned int)&v28 ^ __security_cookie; v3 = a3; v4 = this; v27 = 0; if ( !WaitForSingleObject(hHandle, 0) ) goto LABEL_2; unknown_libname_115(v3); v6 = sub_435E86(v26); unknown_libname_113(v6); v7 = sub_435E86(v26); unknown_libname_113(v7); LOBYTE(v27) = 2; sub_402793(&a2); sub_42BF09(&v25, &v23); LOBYTE(v27) = 3; v8 = (int)_LN34_4(v4, 0, 0, 0, 0); v9 = v8; if ( !v8 ) { ATL::CStringData::Release(v23 - 16); ATL::CStringData::Release(v25 - 16);LABEL_2: ATL::CStringData::Release(a2 - 16); return -20; } v10 = v23; v27 = 2; LOBYTE(v27) = 5; v11 = (int)sub_4415E2(v8, 0, v23, 0, 1u, 0, 0, 0x20000000u); if ( !v11 ) goto LABEL_6; v27 = 2; LOBYTE(v27) = 7; if ( !CHttpFile::SendRequest(v11, 0, 0, 0, 0) ) ///////////////////////////////////////发送消息 { (*(void (__thiscall **)(int))(*(_DWORD *)v11 + 76))(v11); v13 = *(_DWORD *)v11; v25 = 1; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, signed int))(v13 + 4))(v11, 1); (*(void (__thiscall **)(int))(*(_DWORD *)v9 + 12))(v9); v14 = *(_DWORD *)v9; v25 = 1; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, signed int))(v14 + 4))(v9, 1);LABEL_6: ATL::CStringData::Release(v10 - 16); ATL::CStringData::Release(v25 - 16); v25 = -20;LABEL_7: v12 = v25;LABEL_8: ATL::CStringData::Release(a2 - 16); return v12; } v27 = 2; if ( !CHttpFile::QueryInfoStatusCode(&v22) ) { (*(void (__thiscall **)(int))(*(_DWORD *)v11 + 76))(v11); v15 = *(_DWORD *)v11; v25 = 1; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, signed int))(v15 + 4))(v11, 1); (*(void (__thiscall **)(int))(*(_DWORD *)v9 + 12))(v9); v16 = *(_DWORD *)v9; v25 = 1; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, signed int))(v16 + 4))(v9, 1); ATL::CStringData::Release(v10 - 16); ATL::CStringData::Release(v25 - 16); v25 = -21; goto LABEL_7; } if ( v22 != 200 ) { (*(void (__thiscall **)(_DWORD))(*(_DWORD *)v11 + 76))(v11); v17 = *(_DWORD *)v11; v25 = 1; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, signed int))(v17 + 4))(v11, 1); (*(void (__thiscall **)(_DWORD))(*(_DWORD *)v9 + 12))(v9); v18 = *(_DWORD *)v9; v25 = 1; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, signed int))(v18 + 4))(v9, 1); v12 = v22; ATL::CStringData::Release(v10 - 16); ATL::CStringData::Release(v25 - 16); goto LABEL_8; } Src = 0; memset(&v30, 0, 0x3FFu); sub_4027E0(Caption); v19 = *(_DWORD *)v11; v25 = 1000; v24 = &Src; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, char *, signed int))(v19 + 52))(v11, &Src, 1000); ////////////////CInternetFile_Read 此处地址00440915 一共两次read,调用CInternet::Read sub_4027E0(&Src); ///////////////////// -->调用sub_402466 Src返回的c字符串 此处地址为0042C1F3 写了2个byte的内存,后面都不用看了 (*(void (__thiscall **)(_DWORD))(*(_DWORD *)v11 + 76))(v11); ////////////////////////////CInternetFile::Close v20 = *(_DWORD *)v11; v25 = 1; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, signed int))(v20 + 4))(v11, 1); ////////////////////////////CHttpFile::_scalar_deleting_destructor_ (*(void (__thiscall **)(_DWORD))(*(_DWORD *)v9 + 12))(v9); ////////////////////////////CInternetFile::Close v21 = *(_DWORD *)v9; v25 = 1; (*(void (__thiscall **)(int, signed int))(v21 + 4))(v9, 1); ////////////////////////////sub_440C6D一些字符串释放 ATL::CStringData::Release(v10 - 16); ATL::CStringData::Release(v25 - 16); ATL::CStringData::Release(a2 - 16); return 1;}6)可以发现干货就在最后几行,00440915内部调用CInternet::Read,整个函数一共调用了两次,用ethereal截报文发现客户端向www.seapsoft.com发送两个HTTP请求,服务器回的都是很简单的字符串1,存在Src里,sub_4027E0(&Src)处理一下,写了两个2byte的内存,位置不固定。7)明显的思路是在Src处下内存访问断点,发现到了strtoxl这么个函数,是C的一个内部使用的函数,往上导,到strtol,最后到atol,后来发现这个地址被读了十几次,于是干脆换了另一个方法。程序在请求返回后会设置static字符串,于是在SetWindowTextA处下API断点。往上倒腾,功夫不负有心人,发现了程序的验证逻辑:0042B1F5 > \FF75 DC push dword ptr ss:[ebp-24]0042B1F8 . E8 46620200 call HideWiza.004514430042B1FD . 83F8 1E cmp eax,1E0042B200 . 59 pop ecx0042B201 . 7D 77 jge short HideWiza.0042B27A //////////////////////////////////jump it0042B203 . 83F8 02 cmp eax,20042B206 . 75 21 jnz short HideWiza.0042B2290042B208 . 51 push ecx0042B209 . 8BCC mov ecx,esp0042B20B . 8965 F0 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-10],esp0042B20E . 68 24534700 push HideWiza.004753240042B213 . E8 CF7CFDFF call HideWiza.00402EE70042B218 . 8D45 F0 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-10]0042B21B . 50 push eax0042B21C . E8 EFEEFFFF call HideWiza.0042A1100042B221 . 59 pop ecx0042B222 . 59 pop ecx0042B223 . C645 FC 0A mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-4],0A0042B227 .^ EB 9D jmp short HideWiza.0042B1C6 ////////////////////////////jump back to death0042B229 > 3BC7 cmp eax,edi0042B22B . 74 29 je short HideWiza.0042B2560042B22D . 83F8 14 cmp eax,140042B230 . 74 24 je short HideWiza.0042B2560042B232 . 51 push ecx0042B233 . 8BCC mov ecx,esp0042B235 . 8965 F0 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-10],esp0042B238 . 68 E4524700 push HideWiza.004752E40042B23D . E8 A57CFDFF call HideWiza.00402EE70042B242 . 8D45 F0 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-10]0042B245 . 50 push eax0042B246 . E8 C5EEFFFF call HideWiza.0042A1100042B24B . 59 pop ecx0042B24C . 59 pop ecx0042B24D . C645 FC 0C mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-4],0C0042B251 .^ E9 70FFFFFF jmp HideWiza.0042B1C6 ////////////////////////////jump back to death0042B256 > 51 push ecx0042B257 . 8BCC mov ecx,esp0042B259 . 8965 F0 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-10],esp0042B25C . 68 0C534700 push HideWiza.0047530C0042B261 . E8 817CFDFF call HideWiza.00402EE70042B266 . 8D45 F0 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-10]0042B269 . 50 push eax0042B26A . E8 A1EEFFFF call HideWiza.0042A1100042B26F . 59 pop ecx0042B270 . 59 pop ecx0042B271 . C645 FC 0B mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-4],0B0042B275 .^ E9 4CFFFFFF jmp HideWiza.0042B1C6 ////////////////////////////jump back to death0042B27A > 8B4D E4 mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-1C]0042B27D . 8BD1 mov edx,ecx0042B27F . 6BD2 0D imul edx,edx,0D0042B282 . 81EA 2E160000 sub edx,162E0042B288 . 3BD0 cmp edx,eax0042B28A . 74 46 je short HideWiza.0042B2D2 //////////////////////////////////jump it0042B28C . 51 push ecx0042B28D . 8BCC mov ecx,esp0042B28F . 8965 F0 mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-10],esp0042B292 . 68 E4524700 push HideWiza.004752E40042B297 . E8 4B7CFDFF call HideWiza.00402EE70042B29C . 8D45 F0 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-10]0042B29F . 50 push eax0042B2A0 . E8 6BEEFFFF call HideWiza.0042A1100042B2A5 . 59 pop ecx0042B2A6 . 59 pop ecx0042B2A7 . FF30 push dword ptr ds:[eax] ; /Arg10042B2A9 . 8B4D E0 mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-20] ; |0042B2AC . C645 FC 0D mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-4],0D ; |0042B2B0 . E8 2A1F0000 call HideWiza.0042D1DF ; \HideWiza.0042D1DF0042B2B5 . 8B4D F0 mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-10]0042B2B8 . 83C1 F0 add ecx,-100042B2BB . C645 FC 07 mov byte ptr ss:[ebp-4],70042B2BF . E8 DF5DFDFF call HideWiza.004010A30042B2C4 . 8B4D EC mov ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-14]0042B2C7 . 57 push edi ; /Arg10042B2C8 . E8 F61F0000 call HideWiza.0042D2C3 ; \HideWiza.0042D2C30042B2CD . E9 B8020000 jmp HideWiza.0042B58A0042B2D2 > 6BC9 0B imul ecx,ecx,0B0042B2D5 . 81F1 07060000 xor ecx,6070042B2DB . 8BC1 mov eax,ecx0042B2DD . 894D EC mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-14],ecx0042B2E0 . B9 10270000 mov ecx,27100042B2E5 . 3BC1 cmp eax,ecx0042B2E7 . 7D 0A jge short HideWiza.0042B2F3 //////////////////////////////////auto jump it0042B2E9 > 6BC0 0A imul eax,eax,0A0042B2EC . 3BC1 cmp eax,ecx0042B2EE .^ 7C F9 jl short HideWiza.0042B2E90042B2F0 . 8945 EC mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-14],eax0042B2F3 > 3D A0860100 cmp eax,186A00042B2F8 . 7C 15 jl short HideWiza.0042B30F //////////////////////////////////auto jump it0042B2FA . EB 03 jmp short HideWiza.0042B2FF0042B2FC > 8B45 EC mov eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-14]0042B2FF > 6A 0A push 0A0042B301 . 99 cdq0042B302 . 59 pop ecx0042B303 . F7F9 idiv ecx0042B305 . 3D A0860100 cmp eax,186A00042B30A . 8945 EC mov dword ptr ss:[ebp-14],eax0042B30D .^ 7D ED jge short HideWiza.0042B2FC0042B30F > 893D 40F04800 mov dword ptr ds:[48F040],edi0042B315 . E8 6CAB0000 call HideWiza.00435E860042B31A . 50 push eax0042B31B . 8D4D E4 lea ecx,dword ptr ss:[ebp-1C]0042B31E . E8 816DFDFF call HideWiza.004020A40042B323 . FF75 EC push dword ptr ss:[ebp-14]0042B326 . 8D45 E4 lea eax,dword ptr ss:[ebp-1C]0042B329 . 68 F0EF4600 push HideWiza.0046EFF0 ; ASCII "%d"8)0042D21B是CWnd::SetWindowText,他调用SetWindowTextA显示序列号无效字符串0042D21B的调用者为0042B1CB,找通向0042B1CB的跳转,有三处,还都在后边,分别是227 251 275,分析一下这段代码,发现eax被判了多次,且eax=1,可以初步判定这就是服务器返回值。0042B201处判断eax是不是不小于1e,如果小于1e,再判断是不是2,如果是2,进入227玩完;不是2,判断是不是14,不是的话进入251玩完,是的话进入275玩完。总之是进入了死胡同,只好在前面的0042B201处jmp掉。(顺便说一句,自己修改一下返回值对照程序可以发现数字的含义:2是序列号已存在,14没看,1也就是其它情况是序列号无效。)随后在0042B28A处发现一个je,一般相等肯定是验证对不对,肯定是好的,不用看直接jmp掉,最后什么都没改,程序已经crack掉了,记录一下中间没改却实现的跳转,0042B2E7和0042B2F8,为保险起见,可以jmp一下。 本文章原创来源:http://www.hackwd.com/

Tags:[db:关键词]

作者:Hacker

文章评论评论内容只代表网友观点,与本站立场无关!

   评论摘要(共 0 条,得分 0 分,平均 0 分) 查看完整评论
关于本站 - 网站帮助 - 广告合作 - 下载声明 - 友情连接- 网站地图
Copyright © 2015-2016 Hackwd.Com. All Rights Reserved .
本站内容来源网络收集,仅供用于黑客技术安全学习参考,请遵守相关法律法规
打造国内最大的黑客技术资源免费发布站
提供最权威的黑客攻防教程,黑客安全工具
免费黑客网-黑客技术,黑客工具,黑客联盟,黑客基地,黑客网站,黑客论坛